T he movement toward physician-assisted suicide, also called assisted death (AD), is built upon a fundamental moral premise: each of us should have control over our lives and deaths. Moreover, the relief of suffering, a core premise of traditional medical ethics, is integral to the care of dying people. Physician assistance in facilitating death is therefore appropriate and justified.
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We disagree. Although autonomy is a fundamental principle of ethical medical practice, we wish to advance an alternative value, that of the public good, to offset that of autonomy. In our view, the concept of the public good is the more appropriate moral and political framework for the consideration of AD. It takes better account of setting boundaries on physician assistance in dying and lessens a basic contradiction to and the undercutting of important government and private sector efforts to reduce sharply rising national suicide rates.
The concept of the public good has a long and rich ancestry. Often called "the common good," its lineage can be traced back to Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Philosophers and scholars disagree on the nuances of the term, but most generally understand the public good to mean common interest or collective well-being. Although we exist as individuals, we also live as members of communities that uphold our personal welfare. We are therefore obligated to support the good of our communities, our collective welfare. The concept surfaced strongly during the Enlightenment era of the 17th and 18th centuries, even as emerging calls for greater individual freedom were pitted against it. That struggle emerged early in American history, among the founding fathers. Of late, the concept of the public good has gained ground, stressing our need for a society that takes full account of the social support that all of us collectively need for our individual lives to flourish (often called the "private good"). Healthcare policies, national security needs, police and fire protection, and suicide prevention programs fall under the scope of the public good.
This perspective brings the public good perspective in the AD debate to the fore, spelling out its importance. We do this by exploring four themes: suicide as a public health problem, the role of physicians in end-of-life care, the perspective of patients who desire AD, and autonomy as a value. Although our primary focus is physician-assisted suicide, which we understand to be a physician's deliberate provision to a patient the knowledge or means to die by suicide, we also sometimes refer to cases of euthanasia, which is the direct and deliberate termination of a patient's life. Advocates of AD maintain that the two are distinct, but it is critical to note that the line between the two is blurred.
Suicide as a Public Health Crisis
Largely absent from the debate surrounding AD is the parallel rise in national suicide rates, which governmental and private sector efforts seek to thwart. Approximately 43,000 people will die this year by suicide, an increase of 24% between 1999 and 2014. 1 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many states made suicide illegal, but by the middle of the 20th century, those laws were repealed. As such, it became legal for individuals to take their own lives, and thousands do so each year.
The legalization of suicide created a paradox. This new and unbounded freedom could not simply be embraced as an unalloyed social good. Psychiatrists identified a range of pathologies, notably depression, as causes of suicide-pathologies that are in principle treatable. By the 1980s, suicide came to be understood as a public health harm rather than a personal moral failing or medical problem. Both the National Institute of Mental Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention took on suicide as an important issue for research and education. 2, 3 In 1987 the nonprofit American Foundation for Suicide Prevention was established, followed by others. An informal social rule emerged: bystanders to an attempted suicide should intervene to prevent it. "Suicide bridges" were fitted with suicide barriers, including nets and meshes.
There is, in short, a striking conflict between suicide prevention efforts and legal AD. It is at the very least strange that the first two states to legalize AD, Oregon and Washington, have launched ambitious suicide-reduction programs that make no mention of their coexistence with the AD legislation. The language used in Oregon to describe the suicide problem is blunt and strong: "Suicide is one of Oregon's most persistent public health problems." 4 No less strong is its ultimate aim, encouraging the adoption of "a Zero Suicide initiative as an aspirational goal." Is there to be no effort made to reduce those AD suicides? The answer, curiously, is no. Self-killing by AD is not officially counted among the overall suicide statistics at a state or federal level. According to the laws in the districts that have legalized AD, death by AD is not to be considered suicide, homicide, or mercy killing from a legal perspective. Perhaps the rationale is that this form of ending one's life is different enough to justify special treatment, but then the calculated move to eliminate the word suicide altogether may have played a role, even at the government data-collection level.
In contrast to hypotheses by Judge Richard Posner and others that the legalization of AD would decrease the nonassisted suicide rate, 5 there is evidence of a plausible correlation between the rise in state-level suicides and AD rates. This is apparent in Oregon, where AD was legalized at the end of 1997. Beginning in 1998 and consistently thereafter, the increase in AD cases in Oregon paralleled an increase in overall state suicide increases, and this held also in neighboring Washington. A 2015 study by Jones and Paton found that legalizing AD was associated with a 6.3% increase in total suicides (assisted and unassisted). For people older than 65 years, there was a 14.5% increase in total suicides. 6 This should come as no surprise. Suicide research has for years reinforced the "social contagion" or "Werther effect" of suicide: deaths by suicide increase in response to publicized suicides. The rise in AD strongly suggests that the Werther effect may be at play-a contagion that works in both directions.
The efforts in Oregon and Washington to legalize AD received significant media attention. As a result, many came to view suicide as a rational way of solving the problem of human suffering. In his commentary on the study by Jones and Paton, Kheriaty asserts that AD as a purely private decision is undercut by social context and regular media publicity about the issue. 7 The 2014 nationally reported story about 29-year-old Brittany Maynard is a particularly conspicuous example. 8 After receiving a diagnosis of an intractable brain tumor, Maynard moved from California to Oregon to take advantage of AD. Hers was a fresh face for an old cause, and the media attention she received served to influence legislation in her home state of California, which legalized AD in 2015.
Role of Physicians
Thousands of people die by suicide with no help from others each year. Why, then, is there a call for physicians to play a role? There are three likely answers. First, physicians possess the means necessary to ensure death, which is by no means guaranteed by amateurs using guns, pills, or leaps from high places. Second, the presence of physicians sanitizes or reduces any stigma from the hastened death, legitimizing AD as fundamentally a medical issue. For both patient and physician, AD becomes another medical procedure by which the doctor may honor professional obligations to relieve suffering. Third, the presence of physicians legitimizes self-killing. Consider the following: If a friend gives me his gun so that I can kill myself, that friend can be charged (in most states) with a felony. But my doctor giving me pills so that I may kill myself no longer counts as suicide. Rather, my doctor is "assisting" my death. This scenario highlights the quiet shift in language from "physician-assisted suicide" to "assisted death" or "aid in dying."
The public good is threatened when physicians play a direct role in deliberately ending a life. Medical ethics teaches that doctors have a fiduciary relationship with their patients. Patients trust that physicians are "on their side" and bound professionally to advocate for their health. This role is compromised by conferring on physicians the power to adjudicate whose life is worth living. In states where AD is legal, doctors make this determination by choosing (or not) to grant prescriptions for lethal drugs. The power differential between doctor and patient makes particularly unsettling a physician's de facto agreement that a patient would be better off dead.
The ongoing debate about the role of physicians in capital punishment offers an important precedent. A medical professional agreement has developed that, regardless of a physician's personal beliefs about capital punishment, doctors should play no role in assisting in it. 9 One of the earlier motivations for doctors to participate in capital punishment was to relieve pain and suffering, but this justification also was ultimately rejected. Capital punishment has sharply declined through the years. To what extent physicians' rejection played a role in that development is not known, but it could not have hurt the cause of those working to eliminate it.
Who Wants AD and Why?
A curious feature of AD and euthanasia is that a majority of those who elect AD do not do so to relieve physical pain. The main reasons, commonly called "existential," for requesting AD in Oregon in 2015 (and remarkably similar in Washington) 10 are less able to engage in activities that make life enjoyable (96.2%), loss of autonomy (92.4%), and loss of dignity (75.4%).
Although most people in Oregon who elect AD have cancer (72%), these reasons cut across other diseases as well. Regardless of illness, only 28.7% cite "inadequate pain control or concern about it" as a reason for electing AD. Almost all (92%) patients have received hospice care, and therefore their physical and psychological suffering have been, on some level, attended to-if not well. The findings are similar in other countries where AD is legal. In a study of the reasons that Germans elected AD, researchers found loss of life perspective in the face of a severe disease (29%), fear of care dependency (24%), and weariness of life without any severe disease (20%).
11 Notably, 14.5% of patients had known psychiatric diagnoses. In only 12.8% of selfkillings did patients cite nontreatable symptoms as a reason.
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Depression is known to be a leading cause of suicide; however, data from Oregon show that only approximately 5% of people electing AD have been referred for psychiatric evaluation. This is unsettling considering that the majority of patients who elect AD have cancer and that depression is a comorbidity affecting up to 50% of US patients with cancer. 12 Oregon's annual reports offer no explanation.
How might we best make sense of this idiosyncratic minority of dying patients? Are their existential reasons truly medical in nature, justifying relief that only physicians can legitimate? If "dignity" means a life without misery or helplessness, then life itself is full of indignities that every human being will experience. Almost all lethal diseases will reduce life's pleasures and an individual's autonomy. Physicians cannot and should not be expected to use AD to relieve that existential burden.
Alternatively, if dignity as it is more commonly used (the UN Declaration of Human Rights) is meant to signify a belief in the inherent value of every human life, whatever a person's physical or mental condition, then dignity cannot be lost. This remains the case even if someone subjectively believes that illness, vulnerability, or dependency destroys dignity. In only the weakest sense of the term, indignity can mean vomiting, incontinence, loss of weight and appearance, or other common unsavory features of dying. Indignity often is defined as a "feeling of shame or embarrassment." That is probably closest to the sense of dignity meant in citing a loss of it.
Autonomy
The historical development of the concept of autonomy shows that there is no inherent limit to possible interpretations and political and ethical deployment. Patient autonomy arose in the latter half of the 20th century in response to physician paternalism. The patient rights movement empowered the nonmedical layperson as the best decision maker with regard to health. Increasingly, patients are coming to demand what they think is best for their health, often without understanding the ramifications of their decisions on their own health or on the health of their communities. The medical profession has served to reify this ardent self-determinism by shifting to a provider-consumer model of medical care.
Such an unprecedented exalting of individual autonomy has led to an expansion of patient demands with regard to endof-life health care. In the Netherlands and Belgium, reasons for euthanasia have increasingly included depression, dementia, and being "tired of living." 13 A proposal in the Netherlands to allow healthy older adults to be euthanized if they believe that they have lived long enough reveals this gradual, open-ended, perfectly logical trajectory of autonomy. In Belgium, there is no low age limit for euthanasia, and the first boy was euthanized in September 2016. 13 Although AD advocates insist that this could never happen in the United States, there are in fact increasing calls for the inclusion of dementia in expanded legislation. 14 As matters now stand, the United States provides a fertile field for the growth of reasons for AD and of suicide more generally; they are growing simultaneously. The United States does not need more suicide of any kind. If reducing suicide is a valid public health initiative, then we should not support the further expansion of AD.
Conclusions
Each of us lives within the context of a broader society; hence, our personal health is intertwined with our collective health, that is, our personal good is inextricably linked to the public good. The decision to end one's life is never a purely isolated one; autonomous acts always induce a ripple effect. Because physician involvement confers legitimacy on AD, we must remain mindful of the ramifications for the public good. Suicide begets suicide, and nonassisted suicide is on the rise around the United States. As we have shown, in contrast to expectations that the legalization of AD would decrease nonassisted suicide, the data suggest the opposite. Although we cannot state unequivocally that the legalization of AD is tied to the rise in suicide rates (or vice versa), we can assert that both AD and nonassisted suicide are on the rise, and as partakers in the public good, none of us will escape the effects.
